Worldcom, Inc. v. International Controllers, Inc.
CV 990173211
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD – NORWALK, AT STAMFORD2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 909
March 27, 2000, Filed
Memorandum of Decision
This court must decide whether to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no issue of material fact and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff, WorldCom, Inc., filed a complaint on July 13, 1999, alleging that the defendant, International Controllers, Inc. (Icon) “has failed and/or refused to make payment to WorldCom of the amounts due in breach of the parties’ agreement.” The alleged breach arises out of a service agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to provide the defendant with certain telecommunications services, for which the defendant agreed to pay. The plaintiff alleges that there remains due and owing from Icon to WorldCom, the sum of $46,364.22, including service charges and/or interest. The defendant filed a special defense claiming that the plaintiff has been paid in full according to the terms of the agreement between the parties. Specifically, the defendant alleges that there has been accord and satisfaction because on October 4, 1999, the defendant tendered a check for $675.17 labeled “full & final pymt” to the plaintiff which the plaintiff subsequently cashed.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, n1 claiming that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the accord and satisfaction of any debt owed. The plaintiff responded by claiming that issues of material fact exist as to whether the plaintiff knowingly accepted the check as full payment of the defendant’s obligation and as to whether the plaintiff has complied or intends to comply with General Statutes 42a-3-311(c) which provides a means for avoiding inadvertent accord and satisfaction.
n1 Defendant’s memorandum accompanying its motion for summary judgment mistakenly states: “Applying this standard to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment because Defendant cannot show there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.”
“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 554, 707 A.2d 15 (1998). “A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). “A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 379.
The plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to its knowledge that the check was accepted as full satisfaction of the defendant’s obligation under the agreement. General Statutes 42a-3-311(d) n2 provides in pertinent part that, “[a] claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.” The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff’s “Manager of Corporate Credit” states that “neither Credit Representatives or Treasury Employees review checks for memorandums or restrictive endorsements prior to forwarding the checks for deposit” and that the plaintiff “did not know that Icon tendered a check payable in the amount of $675.17 as full and final payment of the amount due and owing of $46,364.22.” Connecticut courts have consistently held that “the issue of notice or knowledge . . . is a question of fact and therefore properly within the province of the trier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 45 Conn. Supp. 397, 716 A.2d 967 (1998). The issue of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the check as full and final payment in the present case is an issue reserved for the trier of fact, and therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
n2 General Statutes 42a-3-311 reads:
Accord and satisfaction by use of instrument. (a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply. (b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. (c) Subject to subsection (d), a claim is not discharged under subsection (b) if either of the following applies: (1) The claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and (ii) the instrument or accompanying communication was not received by that designated person, office, or place. (2) The claimant, whether or not an organization, proves that within ninety days after payment of the instrument, the claimant tendered repayment of the amount of the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted. This paragraph does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a statement complying with paragraph (1)(i). (d) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.
Additionally, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the plaintiff’s compliance with General Statutes 42a-3-311(c)(2). This provision is designed to prevent inadvertent accord and satisfaction by rendering a claim not discharged if it is repaid within 90 days after payment of the instrument. Payment on the check at issue in the present case occurred on October 14, 1999, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on December 15, 1999, before the 90-day window had expired. Because the determination of whether the plaintiff has subsequently repaid the claim amount to the defendant will make a difference in the outcome of this case, it is a material fact at issue. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
BY THE COURT
D’Andrea, J.