Olcott Associates v. Marion Osman
SPH 851030510, HA739
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD- NEW BRITAIN
AT HARTFORD, HOUSING SESSION
1986 Conn. Super. LEXIS 143
March 31, 1986, Decided
Memorandum of Decision
Defendant tenant has resided in her apartment for approximately eight years. Although the plaintiff introduced a written lease for the annual period expiring June 30, 1985, the parties agree that since August 1, 1985 the arrangement has been a month-to-month lease. See Lease paragraph 19, plaintiff’s exhibit A. The apartment has been subsidized through the Federal Section 8.
The defendant’s sixteen-year old son resides with her. He attends school and is employed part-time; both activities require year-round transportation for which his mother purchased an expensive light weight twelve-speed bike. Although the plaintiff provided an outside bike rack and winter basement storage, the mother objected to the arrangement because of her concern for security and all weather exposure. The bike was put in the teenager’s bedroom.
Having redecorated the complex, present management objects to using the hall to transport the bike; the landlord was attempting to prevent carpet tracks caused by bike riding in the hall. Plaintiff’s exhibit D. Beginning in September 1984 the landlord adopted bike regulations and revised a new lease. Whatever the regulations, the tenant must receive notice before the 47a-15 warning. Grove Hill Condominium v. Gillum, 11 C.L.T. No. 51 at 18 (12/23/85) # 651. The evidence is inconclusive whether a general announcement was sent to all tenants in September, but beginning in April the landlord initiated individual conferences or letters with all effected tenants. When the tenant denied receipt of a July 8, 1985 notice, a duplicate was sent on October 15, 1985 advising of a “policy that all bicycles be kept in the rear of the building on the bicycle rack provided for all tenants’ use and requesting that tenant remove the bicycle from your apartment immediately.” Plaintiff’s exhibits B and C.
At some point the tenant contacted the Housing Authority of Manchester; the administrator of Section 3 program. Whether the referral related to rent or bike storage, General Statute 47a-20 would not apply.
The situation continued to deteriorate. In order to comply with 47a-15, plaintiff’s property manager sent notice on August 3, 1985 to the tenant to remedy a “material non-compliancy” i.e. failure to park the bicycle in the outside rack. While referring to 21 days, the notice failed to inform the tenant of the 30-day termination factor. The notice was ineffective. 47a-15; Practice Book Form 701.1. Consequently, the subsequent September notice to quit was invalid, and the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Marrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 497 A.2d 67 (1985); Practice Book 145.
In view of the jurisdictional defect, the court need not now consider whether the evidence would support the validity of a 47a-9 rule. Nor need the court decide whether any compliance with Section 8 federal regulation was required. Manchester Garden Assoc. v. Dermirgian, 5 C.L.T. No. 53 at 1, (19). However, it is axiomatic that counterclaims, even based on 42-110, seeking damages are not permitted in summary process actions.
When the teenager recently received a stereo rig, he apparently decided that there was not enough space for both the equipment and the bike in the bedroom. The bike went, and had not been stored in the apartment for some months. Ironically, at time of trial the practical issue was moot.
Accordingly, judgment for defendant.
GOLDSTEIN, J.