CFM OF CONNECTICUT VS. TAUFIQUL CHOWDHURY, ET AL.
SPH – 8908-51658, # 909
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD- NEW BRITAIN
AT HARTFORD, HOUSING SESSION
1989 Conn. Super. LEXIS 140
November 15, 1989, Decided
November 16, 1989 Filed
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff brought this summary process seeking to evict defendants, sublessees, from premises at 294-306 Farmington Avenue, Hartford. Plaintiff was the tenant under a written lease of those premises from October 1, 1988. Defendants have moved to dismiss the action on two grounds, the first of which is dispositive. Defendants assert that the notice to quit was not served by a proper person.
On July 20, 1989, plaintiff issued a notice signed by its attorney, John Timbers. On the same date, Mr. Timbers served the notice to quit on the defendants by leaving it “with the person in charge of operation at the premises…” When defendants did not vacate “on or about August 1, 1989,” Plaintiff filed this action. Mr. Timbers signed the writ, summons and complaint and entered his appearance for plaintiff.
Defendants argue that Mr. Timbers was not either a proper officer or an indifferent person required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-23(c). Since summary process is a creature of statute, the statutory requirements are to be followed strictly. Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953); Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App. 439, 452-53, 473 A.2d 318 (1984). The Supreme Court has said, in a different statutory context, that “indifferent” as a statutory adjective has no meaning different than its popular one. Lampson Lumber Co. v. Rosadino, 141 Conn. 193, 197, 104 A.2d 362 (1954). Just as the Court there was “bound to presume that the legislature had a purpose is using the phrase “indifferent person,” this court cannot ignore the commonly accepted meaning of the words used. Id. An indifferent person is one who is unbiased, impartial, and not affected to one party more than another, Id. at 196. Since Mr. Timbers as attorney for CFM had issued the notice to quit, it cannot be said that he was impartial. See also Harmel Realty v. Lejeune, 1986 Conn. Super. LEXIS 145, SPH 3603-32A95 (1986) H # 750 and Battison v. Martinez, SPH 8506-28960 (1985) H # 670. Since a corporate lessor can act only through an attorney in court proceedings and through agents or employees otherwise, it cannot be said that an attorney who acts for the corporation in representing its interests can also be an indifferent person for the purpose of serving a notice to quit any more than as individual lessor’s agent can serve as an indifferent person for such a purpose.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
Wendy Susco, J.